A Problem with Merriam–Webster’s Definitions
At first glance, the question sounds either trivial or provocative: Is Judaism a religion? Most people assume the answer is obviously yes. Dictionaries say so. Survey forms say so. “World religions” textbooks say so.
But when the question is taken seriously—analytically, not sentimentally—the answer becomes much less clear. When Merriam–Webster’s own definitions of “religion” are applied rigorously, Judaism does not fit them cleanly at all.
This is not because Judaism is defective or anomalous. It is because the modern category of religion, as defined in contemporary English, is narrower, more belief‑centered, and more culturally specific than we usually admit.
What follows is a systematic walk through Merriam–Webster’s definitions of religion, using Judaism as a stress test—not to attack the dictionary, but to see what its definitions can and cannot actually do.
Merriam–Webster’s Definitions of Religion
Merriam–Webster lists several senses of the word religion. Only two plausibly aim to classify traditions like Judaism. The remaining senses are metaphorical, narrowly institutional, or archaic, and are addressed in a footnote below.
Before asking whether Judaism fits these definitions, it is necessary to make explicit what the definitions themselves assume about how a religion is organized and how it persists over time. Definitions are not neutral labels; they embed models.
What Merriam–Webster’s Definitions Imply
Definition 1
“An organized system of religious attitudes, beliefs, and practices.”
Also: the religious beliefs, observances, and social practices found within a given cultural context.
Even before addressing the problem of circularity, Definition 1 implies a particular internal structure. By treating attitudes and beliefs as organizing elements, the definition assumes that beliefs and attitudes are central rather than incidental, that practices are meaningful insofar as they express those beliefs, and that the system is organized around interior states.
Attitudes and beliefs, however, are not inherited conditions. They are held, adopted, and maintained by individuals. A system organized around them necessarily depends on some form of acceptance or endorsement in order to reproduce itself. In other words, Definition 1 implicitly models religion as something that persists because people hold the relevant beliefs and attitudes.
Definition 2
“Commitment or devotion to a god or gods, a system of beliefs, or religious observance; the service and worship of the supernatural.”
Definition 2 removes any remaining ambiguity. “Commitment” and “devotion” are voluntary, intentional, interior, and revocable. They describe a system sustained by conscious assent. One cannot be devoted accidentally or committed by inheritance alone.
Definition 2 therefore makes explicit what Definition 1 implied: religion is understood as something that persists because individuals adopt, endorse, and maintain certain beliefs or devotional orientations.
The Shared Model
Taken together, Definitions 1 and 2 assume a belief‑contract model of religion: belief and attitude are primary; practice flows from belief; continuity depends on repeated assent; participation presupposes endorsement. This model fits many modern religious traditions extremely well. The point here is not that this model is incoherent, but that it is particular, not universal.
Definition 1: The Circularity Problem
Returning to Definition 1, its central flaw now comes into focus. It defines religion by reference to religious attitudes, beliefs, and practices—without specifying what makes an attitude, belief, or practice “religious” in the first place. Reduced to its logical structure, the definition amounts to:
Religion is the system of things that are religious.
That is not an explanation; it is a labeling loop.
Circular definitions fail precisely where definitions are meant to do work. They cannot adjudicate boundary cases. They smuggle in cultural assumptions. And they insulate themselves from critique by defining counterexamples out of existence.
Judaism exposes this weakness cleanly. It includes practices that do not logically depend on belief, identity that does not depend on devotional posture, law that functions without theological unanimity, and continuity that does not require explicit assent—not because belief, devotion, theology, or meaning are absent, but because none of them is made the sole load‑bearing condition of belonging. In short, Judaism is orthopraxic rather than orthodoxic. Under Definition 1, it qualifies as a religion only if we already assume that it is, which is precisely the point at issue.
This structure is visible in ordinary Jewish life: Jews may practice, belong, and transmit Judaism amid wide variation in belief without threatening continuity.
In short, Judaism prioritizes participation and peoplehood over doctrinal assent, allowing belief and theology to vary without threatening continuity.
The “also” clause in Definition 1 worsens the problem. By defining religion as whatever a culture treats as religious, the definition collapses into cultural self‑description rather than classification.
As a dictionary gloss, this definition may be serviceable. As an analytic definition, it is defective.
Definition 2 Revisited
Definition 2, by contrast, is clear—and it excludes Judaism outright as a general classification. Judaism can include devotion, worship, belief, and supernaturalism. But Judaism does not require any of them in order to remain Judaism.
A definition that excludes entire, self‑identified Jewish movements cannot plausibly be said to define Judaism.
The Aggregate Result
Taken strictly, the result is striking:
Definition 1 fits only by circular assumption.
Definition 2 excludes major forms of Judaism.
There is no Merriam–Webster definition under which Judaism cleanly fits without distortion. This is not an argument that Judaism lacks meaning, structure, or depth. It is an argument that the category religion, as defined here, does not map cleanly onto Judaism at all.
What This Reveals
Judaism is not a religion that later acquired a people. It is a people that developed religious grammars. Judaism can contain religion and express religion, but it is not constituted by religion as defined in modern Western lexicons.
A more accurate description would be:
Judaism is an inherited peoplehood and civilizational tradition that includes religious expression among its modes, but is not reducible to religion as defined in contemporary English.
If a definition cannot tell us whether Judaism is a religion without presupposing the answer, the problem is not Judaism. It is the definition.
Footnote
Merriam–Webster definitions 3–5 define religion respectively as: (3) an interest or activity pursued with intense devotion (a metaphorical extension), (4) the state of being a member of a religious order (a narrow institutional usage), and (5) an archaic term meaning scrupulous conformity or conscientiousness. These senses illustrate the semantic range of the word religion, but they do not function as classificatory definitions and therefore have no bearing on whether Judaism fits the category analytically.
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